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Abstract 
Some scientifically well-established results—such as the fact that emission of greenhouse 
gases produces global warming—are rejected by sizable proportions of the population in 
the United States and other countries. Rejection of scientific findings is mostly driven by 
motivated cognition: People tend to reject findings that threaten their core beliefs or 
worldview. At present, rejection of scientific findings by the U.S. public is more 
prevalent on the political right than the left. Yet the cognitive mechanisms driving 
rejection of science, such as the superficial processing of evidence toward the desired 
interpretation, are found regardless of political orientation. General education and 
scientific literacy do not mitigate rejection of science but, rather, increase the polarization 
of opinions along partisan lines. In contrast, specific knowledge about the mechanisms 
underlying a scientific result—such as human-made climate change—can increase the 
acceptance of that result. 
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Vaccinations cause autism, climate change is a hoax, tobacco is good for you, AIDS is an 
invention of the U.S. government, and now even the Earth is flat again (Strauss, 2016). 
Many scientific propositions that have been accepted as facts by the relevant expert 
communities are subject to public dispute and, sometimes, outright rejection. When 
sizable segments of the population reject findings from medical research, adverse 
consequences to public health are never far behind, as in the case of anti-vaccination 
movements (Gangarosa et al., 1998; A. Smith, Yarwood, & Salisbury, 2007). When 
science denial becomes official government policy, the death toll can run into the 
hundreds of thousands, as in the case of South Africa’s refusal to provide antiretroviral 
treatments for AIDS under President Thabo Mbeki (Chigwedere, Seage, Gruskin, Lee, & 
Essex, 2008). 
In some instances, scientific findings are rejected simply because the public is 
misinformed about an issue. A famous recent case involves the nonexistent but widely 
publicized link between the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism. At 
one point, belief in its existence even affected medical professionals in the United 
Kingdom (Petrovic, Roberts, & Ramsay, 2001). The spread of this mistaken belief was 
aided by inappropriate and unbalanced media reporting (Speers & Lewis, 2004), which 
medical journals arguably failed to counteract (Hilton, Hunt, Langan, Hamilton, & 
Petticrew, 2009). 
Misinformation is often difficult to rebut (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & 
Cook, 2012), and in the case of the MMR vaccine, it took considerable effort and 
expenditure for vaccination rates to increase again (A. Smith et al., 2007). In many other 
situations, scientific findings are rejected not only because the public is misinformed 
about an issue but because the science is in conflict with people’s worldviews, or political 
or religious opinions. In those cases, science is rejected on the basis of motivated 
identity-protective cognition that cannot be understood without consideration of the 
broader societal and political context. From here on, we are exclusively concerned with 
the U.S. context. Public opinions and the political context in other countries may be 
substantially different and may lead to different conclusions. 
When scientists discover a planet in our Milky Way that is made entirely of diamonds 
(Bailes et al., 2011; Galloway, 2011), public fascination and admiration are virtually 
assured. When the same scientific method yields discoveries that are closer to home but 
touch on people’s lifestyle or worldviews, or impinge on corporate interests, the response 
can be anything but favorable. For example, many people resist medical research with 
behavioral or regulatory implications—such as research on the adverse health effects of 
tobacco or alcohol. 
One striking aspect of the public’s views of science is that general level of education, 
scientific knowledge, and science literacy are only modestly predictive of the public’s 
general attitudes toward and trust in science (e.g., Allum, Sturgis, Tabourazi, & Brunton-
Smith, 2008). Moreover, when it comes to specific scientific issues—especially those that 
are politically contested—even those modest associations tend to disappear and are 
replaced by polarization along political lines (e.g., Kahan et al., 2012). There has been a 
decades-long, gradual erosion of trust in the scientific community among conservatives—
but not liberals—since the mid-1970s (Gauchat, 2012). Whereas conservatives and 
liberals did not differ in their trust in science at the beginning of the 1970s, by 2010 the 
polarization had become quite striking, with liberals retaining trust in the scientific 
community and conservatives having reduced theirs. 
This erosion of trust has coincided with the emergence of multiple scientific findings that 
challenge core conservative views, such as belief in the importance and beneficence of 
unregulated free markets. Nowhere is this more apparent than with climate science. The 
overwhelming scientific consensus that greenhouse gas emissions from human economic 
activity are warming the planet (e.g., Cook et al., 2013) is endorsed by the majority of 
liberals and Democrats but rejected by the majority of Republicans and conservatives 
(e.g., Hamilton, 2011; Hamilton, Hartter, Lemcke-Stampone, Moore, & Safford, 2015). 
Perhaps unexpectedly, this polarization along political lines increases with self-reported 
knowledge of the issue (Hamilton, 2011), scientific literacy and numeracy (Kahan et al., 
2012), and education (Hamilton, Hartter, Lemcke-Stampone, et al., 2015). That is, greater 
education or knowledge is associated with increased acceptance of climate science 
among liberals but—ironically—with decreased acceptance among conservatives. 
The polarization along partisan lines is not limited to climate science. For example, 
Hamilton, Hartter, and Saito (2015) showed that trust in scientists regarding vaccinations 
was also greater among Democrats than Republicans, and this polarization again 
increased with increasing education. The conservative-liberal split is particularly 
amplified in attitudes toward vaccinations against sexually transmitted diseases such as 
the human-papillomavirus (HPV), which is responsible for cervical cancer (Kahan, 
Braman, Cohen, Gastil, & Slovic, 2010). The skepticism about vaccinations likely arises 
from conservatives’ fears of government intrusion into parenting. 
In summary, the rejection of specific scientific evidence across a range of issues, as well 
as generalized distrust in science, appears to be concentrated primarily among the 
political right. It does not follow, however, that there are any fundamental differences in 
the cognition between people of differing political attitudes and values. Quite to the 
contrary, the cognitive shortcuts that drive the rejection of scientific evidence appear to 
be politically symmetrical. 
The Cognition Underlying the Rejection of Science 
What do cows drink? If you were tempted to respond “milk,” then this would reflect a 
cognitive shortcut—a so-called heuristic—that responds to the question merely on the 
basis of association rather than deep reflection. Similar heuristics that affect the 
processing of scientific information are readily triggered in the laboratory. When 
participants are presented with synthetic data that are amenable to a quick—but 
inaccurate—interpretation, and a complex—but accurate—understanding, the quick 
heuristic-based interpretation is triggered whenever it is worldview congruent. The more 
complex and accurate reading of the data is backgrounded when it challenges 
participants’ worldviews. Figure 1 shows synthetic data used as stimuli in an experiment 
by Kahan, Peters, Dawson, and Slovic (2013). The top two tables in the figure show 
hypothetical results from a study involving a fictitious new skin cream, with the outcome 
columns (“rash got better” vs. “rash got worse”) reversed between them. 
[TS: Please insert Figure 1 about here.] 
Fig. 1. 
Synthetic data used as stimuli in an experiment by Kahan, Peters, Dawson, and Slovic 
(2013). See text for details. 
At first glance, the left-hand column in each of the two tables in panel (a) may provide all 
the evidence needed to determine the efficacy of the skin cream, as there are more users 
than non-users whose symptom improved (table on the left) or got worse (table on the 
right). However, this heuristic interpretation is incorrect because it fails to consider the 
base rates—namely, that there are nearly three times as many users than non-users. A 
more complete examination of the pattern would therefore yield the opposite 
understanding, because the proportion of non-users who improved (left) or got worse 
(right) far exceeded the proportion of users who experienced the same outcome. 
The interpretation of these data was wholly determined by participants’ numeracy: Those 
with greater numeric ability detected the complex pattern, whereas those with lesser 
ability reported the opposing conclusion based on the simpler heuristic interpretation. The 
moment the same data were couched in terms of gun control, with crime either increasing 
or decreasing (see the bottom two tables in Fig. 1) as a function of the number of cities 
that did or did not ban carrying concealed handguns (rows), the role of numeracy was 
overpowered by participants’ worldview. Liberals overwhelmingly arrived at the correct 
interpretation when the data showed crime to decrease as a result of gun control, whereas 
they failed to recognize the complete pattern, and settled for the simplistic heuristic 
interpretation, when the data showed crime to increase. The reverse pattern was observed 
for conservatives. The groups did not differ appreciably in the overall extent of their 
reliance on the heuristic, suggesting that the same cognitive processes were engaged to 
protect participants’ worldviews whenever they were challenged by one or the other 
outcome. 
In addition to triggering simplifying heuristics, motivated cognition may also express 
itself as biased risk assessment. For example, when participants are asked to express their 
views on nanotechnology, an issue about which few people are well informed, liberals 
and conservatives do not differ in their risk assessment. However, when information 
about both the risks and the benefits of the technology is provided, the two groups 
become highly polarized, with liberals focusing on the risks and conservatives focusing 
on the benefits (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2009). That is, each group 
foregrounds that aspect of the information that is consonant with their worldview: 
Liberals focus on environmental and health risks, and conservatives focus on the benefits 
of economic development. Similar arguments about differential risk perception have been 
advanced about climate denial (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2011). 
A final element of motivated cognition that suffuses the rejection of science is 
conspiracist thinking. When people are motivated to reject an overwhelming scientific 
consensus, one way in which they may explain this consensus is via the ideation of a 
conspiracy among researchers (Diethelm & McKee, 2009; McKee & Diethelm, 2010). 
Accordingly, around 20% of U.S. residents have been found to endorse the idea that 
climate change “is a hoax perpetrated by corrupt scientists who wish to spend more 
taxpayer money on climate research” (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013), and 
when asked to indicate their affective responses to climate change (by asking respondents 
to provide the “first word, thought, image, or phrase that comes to mind when thinking 
about global warming”), the public’s most common response has been found to be 
conspiratorial in nature, for example by responding with “hoax” (N. Smith & 
Leiserowitz, 2012). In a blind test, discourse on climate-change-contrarian blogs was 
found to be suffused with conspiracist attributes (Lewandowsky et al., 2015). 
Conspiracist ideation is also known to be involved in the rejection of many other well-
established scientific propositions, such as the link between the HIV virus and AIDS 
(Kalichman, 2009) and denial of the benefits of vaccinations (Briones, Nan, Madden, & 
Waks, 2012). The prevalence of conspiracist ideation has not been firmly linked to one or 
the other side of the political spectrum. On the contrary, a recent study suggested that the 
endorsement of conspiracy theories is associated with political extremism irrespective of 
its polarity (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015). 
In summary, the basic cognitive processes implicated in the rejection of science—
namely, cognitive shortcuts, differential risk perception, and conspiracist cognition—
appear to be universal and engaged on both sides of the political aisle. At first glance, this 
conclusion may appear at odds with the earlier discussion that identified distrust of 
scientists and the rejection of evidence as being primarily concentrated among the 
political right. One possible explanation for the asymmetry observed “in the wild” 
invokes the current historical and political context, in which publicly contested scientific 
findings primarily happen to challenge the worldviews of conservatives rather than 
liberals. On this account, the laboratory results would lead us to expect that the reverse 
pattern could be observed if science were to yield evidence contrary to a liberal 
worldview. We would also expect there to be no polarization along partisan lines for 
scientific findings that do not challenge anyone’s worldview—and this is exactly what 
Kahan (2015) reported for risk attitudes toward a number of issues, among them artificial 
food coloring and sweeteners, cell phone radiation, genetically modified food, and 
exposure to high-voltage power lines. 
An alternative explanation recognizes that trust in scientists is lower among conservatives 
than among liberals even for issues on which conservatives might agree with the 
prevailing scientific opinion—for example, on the safety of nuclear power or genetically 
modified organisms (Hamilton, 2015). On this account, the observed political asymmetry 
of the rejection of science reflects a deeper and more pervasive distrust of science by 
conservatives rather than historical coincidence. We suggest that those two competing 
explanations cannot be fully differentiated on the basis of the existing evidence. 
Rational Denial 
No discussion of the rejection of science can be complete without recognizing the role of 
institutionally organized denial (Brulle, 2013; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2003; Proctor, 2011). In scientific research on topics from tobacco or leaded 
gasoline to climate change or alcohol, the fingerprint of corporate interference is readily 
detectable. Recent research has confirmed the effectiveness of such organized denial—
for example, by showing that people’s attitudes toward climate science can be 
compromised by misleading information (McCright, Charters, Dentzman, & Dietz, 2016; 
Ranney & Clark, 2016). Organized denial of science is therefore best considered an 
entirely rational operation that has clear political and economic goals. Seen in this light, 
the tobacco industry’s conspiracist labeling of medical research as a “cartel” that 
“manufactures alleged evidence” (Abt, 1983, p. 127), or U.S. Senator Inhofe’s reference 
to climate change as a “hoax” (Inhofe, 2012), are rational and effective (McCright et al., 
2016; Ranney & Clark, 2016) tools in a political arsenal. 
Similarly, Cook and Lewandowsky (2016) have shown within a Bayesian framework that 
the rejection of evidence can be modeled by a rational belief-updating system under some 
circumstances. Cook and Lewandowsky showed that participants who strongly supported 
free-market economics lowered their acceptance of human-caused global warming in 
response to information about the scientific consensus. This “backfire” effect could be 
modeled within a rational framework because people adjusted their trust in climate 
scientists downward, thereby not only avoiding an adjustment of their belief in the 
science but also safe-guarding their endorsement of free-market economics. 
Thus, although the rejection of scientific evidence can have notable adverse 
consequences for society, it does not follow that the people who reject science do so in an 
irrational manner. Denying the health effects of tobacco may kill people, but it rationally 
maximizes the profits of the tobacco industry. The recruitment of conspiracist ideation in 
support of this goal is therefore a politically rational move. 
Communicating Contested Science 
Although the rejection of science may be driven by a common set of cognitive processes, 
it is clear that political, ideological, and economic factors are paramount. The 
communication of contested science is therefore inextricably caught up in political 
battles, and at least in the case of climate change, it is unlikely that communication alone 
can achieve a reduction in polarization. People’s opinions are partly shaped by the elite 
cues provided by political leaders (Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 2012), and without a 
significant change in those cues, scientific communication efforts face considerable 
challenges. 
Nonetheless, recent research on climate communication has identified several techniques 
that can assist in communicating contested scientific findings . For example, a mere 
change in wording—from “tax” to “offset”—increased Republicans’ willingness to pay 
for carbon-producing activities (Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010). Informing people 
about the pervasive scientific consensus on climate change has also repeatedly been 
shown to increase acceptance of science across the political spectrum (Cook & 
Lewandowsky, 2016; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015). One occasional exception involves Americans 
who are strong adherents of free-market economics (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016). 
Other research has identified the use of narratives—that is, personal anecdotes or 
“storytelling”—as a powerful means to communicate science (e.g., Dahlstrom, 2014). In 
politicized environments, communication can be informed by research on source 
credibility to maximize the likelihood that information will be accepted by the audience 
(Lupia, 2013). 
Finally, even though general education and science literacy are not associated with 
acceptance of climate science (Kahan et al., 2012), recent evidence suggests that 
providing a brief mechanistic explanation of the basic greenhouse effect can reliably and 
lastingly enhance acceptance across the political spectrum (Ranney & Clark, 2016). 
Current Directions 
We have not touched on the role of personal characteristics other than people’s 
worldview. A recent body of work has identified several individual-difference variables, 
such as belief in the paranormal (Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014), that may be 
associated with attitudes toward science. We expect further research along those lines. 
Relatively little is known about the “microcognition” involved in the rejection of science. 
The work of Ranney and Clark (2016) and Kahan et al. (2013) presents promising 
pointers in that direction, as does the research on conspiracist thinking, but we do not yet 
have access to a comprehensive body of knowledge about how people actually think 
when confronted with scientific evidence or facts. 
Recommended Reading 
Cook, J., & Lewandowsky, S. (2012). The debunking handbook. Retrieved from 
http://sks.to/debunk. A brief guide for practitioners about how to correct misinformation, 
available for download in seven languages. (An extended summary of the issue can be 
found in Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012.) 
Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). Merchants of doubt. London, England: 
Bloomsbury Publishing. An in-depth historical analysis of the role of ideology in 
organized denial of well-established scientific facts. 
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